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STUDY ON THE INTEGRATION OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND ACCIDENT RISK ASSESSMENT
MODELS: AIR-MIDAS & TOPAZ
Kevin Corker
San Jose State University
Henk A.P. Blom & Sybert H. Stroeve
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
A computational model of human performance (Air Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis System, Air
MIDAS) and an accident risk assessment methodology (Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer, TOPAZ)
were integrated in order to learn about the similarities and differences of their models, to demonstrate the feasibility
of such integration, and the integration impact on accident risk assessment.
Introduction
In the analysis and design of advanced operations in
complex, dynamic, human-machine systems, accident
risk assessment is a critical component of effective
system engineering. Probability Risk Assessment
(PRA) techniques typically model such complex
system by assigning conditional probabilities of the
success, or failure for system operations into fault
and event trees (e.g. Kumamoto and Henley, 1996).
Subsequently, an assessment of risk is undertaken by
evaluating the combined effects of the conditional
probabilities in these fault and event trees. The role
and contribution of the human operator has proven to
be a significant element to both accident risk
(Hollnagel, 1993), and to system safety and
effectiveness (Dekker 2001).
The development of models that represent the
contribution of the human operator to risk has been
explored for some 30 years (Swain & Guttman 1983).
The function of the human operator was either
assigned a probability of success or failure, as would
be provided for any system component, and the
“integration” was the inclusion of those probabilities in
the overall system success failure assessment. A
serious limitation of fault and event tree based PRA is
its inability to evaluate the effects of concurrent and
dynamic behavior on accident risk. The remedy is to
exploit stochastic dynamical modeling and Monte
Carlo simulation of the concurrent and dynamic
processes for accident risk assessment (e.g. Labeau et
al., 2000) and to include explicit representation of
human performance in individual and on teams (e.g.,.
Cacciabue, 1998 or Corker, 2000)
In order to apply this approach to air traffic
management, multiple human operators and their
interactions with each other and with aircraft and
ground systems have to be modeled and simulated.
Both with the human performance model AirMIDAS (Corker, 2000) and with the accident risk

assessment methodology TOPAZ (Blom et al., 2001,
2003; Stroeve et al., 2003), significant and
complementary headway has been made. We report
here on the integration of Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ in
aviation safety assessment.
The objective of this integration is to combine the
significant advances established in individual human
performance representation and human performance
factors (human factors in general and human
cognitive behavior in particular) through large-scale
simulations for accident risk assessment. As an
objective test for the success of this integration we
hypothesize that this combination allows Air-MIDAS
to provide simulation results for individual human
operators which improves the accident risk
assessment.
The aviation community continues to be concerned
with accident risk and runway operations and several
technologies have been under development to
mitigate this risk. Given the relevance of these
operations to both safety risk and human
performance, an integrated simulation of the baseline
conditions for runway incursion avoidance was
undertaken by Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ simulation
toolset TAXIR for this operation.
Integration of human modeling approaches
Because of the complementary objectives and
separate developments of Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ
their human performance modeling approaches show
similarities and differences. Their potentially
complimentary functions form the reason why this
integration is so useful and challenging at the same
time. In the course of the integration study the
complementary human performance modeling details
of both approaches have become clear. A short
explanation of this is given next, including an
overview in Table 1.
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Table 1 Human performance modeling in AirMIDAS and TOPAZ
A

B

Management
modes
Control Modes

Switching
between modes
Task Scheduling

Resources model

Memory model

C

SA model

D

Human error

E

Behaviour
of
Non-human
entities
Specification
language

F

Air-MIDAS

TOPAZ

Max-load
or
Even-load
Matching with
Rasmussen’s
SRK
(Skill,
Rule,
Knowledge)
Fixed thresholds

None

Goal
oriented
subtask
scheduling
Multiple: Visual,
Auditory,
Cognitive,
Psychomotor
Procedural (with
decay)
Declarative
(with decay)
Knowledge (no
decay)
SA
of
one
human only
Is result of
detailed
modelling
Nominal

Air-MIDAS
specific, based
on LISP

Matching with
Hollnagel’s
tactical
and
opportunistic
control modes
Thresholds with
hysteresis
Priority rules for
aggregated tasks
Aggregation on
the basis of timecritical
tasks/resources
combinations
Aggregated (no
decay)

Multi Agent SA
and interactions
Amalberti’s
error recovery
model is added
Nominal
&
Non-Nominal
Dynamically
Coloured Petri
Nets (DCPN)

Integration of these approaches ensures that the
simulation scenario under examination is jointly
represented in the two modeling systems. This allows
identification of values for specific parameters of
human performance in the TOPAZ simulation model
to be supplied by the Air MIDAS simulation. These
parameter values are generated in Monte Carlo runs
of the human performance model and subsequently
supplied as input to improving TOPAZ simulations.
In so far as the modeling paradigms allow similar
representation, this parameter exchange is
straightforward. For example, simulation of pilot
reaction time to recognition of an incursion by the
taxiing aircraft is represented in both modeling
processes, hence reaction time is a straight forward
parameter value to exchange.

Application context
The following operational concept for crossing of an
active runway is being considered. A simplified
representation of the runway configuration is used, as
shown in Figure 1. It consists of one runway with a
crossing at a length y 3b from the runway start
threshold. The crossing has remotely controlled
stopbars on both sides of the runway. The runway is
being used for taking off aircraft. The traffic crossing
over the runway accounts for traffic between apron(s)
and a second runway. The involved human operators
include the start-up controller, the ground controller,
per runway a runway controller, the departure
controller, and the pilots flying and pilots not flying
of taking-off aircraft and crossing aircraft.
Communication between controllers and aircraft
crews is via standard VHF R/T. Communication
between controllers is supported by telephone lines.
Monitoring by the controllers can be by direct visual
observation and is supported by radar track plots.
Monitoring by the aircraft crews is by visual
observation and is supported by the VHF R/T partyline effect.
In the runway crossing operation considered, the
control over the crossing aircraft is transferred from
the ground controller to the controller of the runway
to be crossed. If the runway controller is aware that
its runway is not used for a take-off, the crew of an
aircraft intending to cross is cleared to do so. The
pilot not flying of the crossing aircraft acknowledges
the clearance and then the pilot flying initiates the
runway crossing. As soon as the crossing aircraft has
vacated the runway, then the pilot not flying reports
this to the controller of that runway. Next the control
over the aircraft is transferred from this runway
controller to either another runway controller or to
the ground controller.

148

controller clearance, and (s)he decides that braking
will stop the aircraft in front of the crossing aircraft.
Initially, the PF of the taxiing aircraft has the SA that
either (s)he is taxiing on a regular taxiway, which
does not cross a runway or (s)he is taxiing on a
taxiway approaching the runway crossing. In the
latter case the PF may have the SA that crossing is
allowed. Both in the case that the PF has the SA that
(s)he is taxiing on a regular taxiway and in the case
that the PF is aware that a runway crossing is
allowed, the PF proceeds on the runway crossing.
During taxiing the PF visually monitors the traffic
situation. The characteristics of the monitoring
process depend on the SA of the PF concerning the
next airport waypoint (either runway crossing or
taxiway). After passage of the stopbar the PF may
receive a hold clearance by the runway controller.
There is a probability that the controller message is
not properly understood by the PF. In response to a
hold clearance or an observed conflict the PF initiates
braking of the aircraft, unless the cockpit of the
crossing aircraft is estimated to be already within a
critical distance of the runway centre-line.
Figure 1: Configuration of active runway crossing
operation considered. Aircraft i and j respectively
take off from a position at the runway start and taxi
along a taxiway leading to a runway crossing at a
given distance from the runway start.
Joint model for integrated simulations
The TOPAZ and Air-MIDAS simulation models
consider the following human agents: pilots flying for
both the taxi aircraft and the taking off aircraft, and
the runway controller. The most important elements
of these human and other entities are shortly
described below.
Initially, the pilot flying (PF) of the taking-off aircraft
has the situation awareness (SA) that take-off is
allowed and initiates a take-off. During the take-off
the PF visually monitors the traffic situation on the
runway. During a monitoring action the PF may not
observe the crossing aircraft, because of a limited
gaze angle or the distance with the crossing aircraft
exceeds a viewing threshold, or occasional headsdown time for engine parameter sampling. The
monitoring process includes distance dependent error
components. Furthermore, the PF monitors the VHF
communication channel. The PF of the taking-off
aircraft starts a collision avoiding braking action if
(s)he observes the crossing aircraft within a critical
distance of the runway centre-line or in reaction to a

The runway controller visually monitors the traffic
situation on the runway. There is a probability that
during monitoring an aircraft is not observed. In
response to an alert, the controller directly monitors
the traffic situation and the TOPAZ controller model
updates the SA. If the controller is aware that the
crossing aircraft has passed the stopbar then (s)he
specifies a hold clearance to both the crossing and the
taking-off aircraft.
Parameters jointly represented
As noted, the representations that the two simulation
modeling systems provide are in some ways similar
and in others different. Upon examination of the
similarities and differences of the models used for the
surface operation considered by Air MIDAS and by
the TOPZ-TAXIR toolset, a list of model parameters
to be affected by the joint runs was identified. These
parameters are grouped and provided as follows:
• braking initiation times of pilots flying;
• inter-monitoring time of pilot flying of
taxiing aircraft;
• duration of visual observation of pilots
flying.
Braking initiation time of PF’s This parameter group
includes the braking initiation times of pilots flying
of taking-off or taxiing aircraft in either tactical of
opportunistic mode, when they have become aware
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of a conflict with the other aircraft. In an overview is
provided of the probability density functions (PDF’s)
and related parameter values for Air-MIDAS and the
original and the modified TOPAZ-TAXIR. In all
three models equal PDF types and parameter values
for the braking initiation times are chosen for the
pilots flying of the taking-off and taxiing aircraft,
regardless of their cognitive control modes.
It was observed that in comparison to Air-MIDAS,
the original TOPAZ-TAXIR has a smaller mean
braking initiation time, and a larger tail (probability
of more than 5 s initiation time). In order to improve
on these aspects, for the modified TOPAZ-TAXIR
model the Rayleigh PDF has been selected. The
improvements are:
• its shape better fits to the Air-MIDAS data,
• it supports positive values only,
• has a more realistic tail than Gaussian PDF
The parameter value of the Rayleigh PDF has been
chosen such that its standard deviation equals the
standard deviation of the PDF chosen in Air-MIDAS.
Inter-monitoring time of PF of taxiing aircraft
It is assumed in TOPAZ-TAXIR that the intermonitoring time of the pilot flying of the taxiing
aircraft is independent from the cognitive control
mode of the pilot. In the original model this time was
represented by an exponential probability density
function. Simulations of Air-MIDAS resulted in a
data-set of 536 inter-monitoring times of the taxiing
pilot flying. These data were well represented by an
exponential PDF. Therefore, in the modified model
the inter-monitoring times of the taxiing PF are also
chosen from an exponential PDF with a mean equal
to the estimated mean of the Air-MIDAS data.
Duration of visual observation of PF’s
This parameter group includes the visual observation
times of pilots flying for the taking-off or taxiing
aircraft in either tactical of opportunistic mode. The
PDF’s of these times in the original model are
exponential PDF’s with a mean that is smaller in the
opportunistic mode than in the tactical mode.
Air-MIDAS simulations provided data on the
duration of the tasks:
• ‘Monitor Out The Window’ for the PF of the
taking-off aircraft, and
• ‘Decide Action - Decide Take-off Spotted’
for the PF of the taxiing aircraft.
These tasks were found to be in good agreement with
the visual observation tasks of the pilots flying of the
taking-off and taxiing aircraft, respectively. These

data were provided for the three control modes used
in Air-MIDAS.
Integration Impact on Collision Risk Model
In Table 2 the collision risk results of both versions
of TOPAZ-TAXIR are shown for three values of the
distance of the runway crossing with respect to the
runway start threshold. It follows from these results
that the collision risks as evaluated by the modified
model are smaller than those evaluated by the
original model and that the relative differences in
collision risk tend to get larger for larger crossing
distances. In all cases, the difference between the
results is within a factor two.
Table 2: Collision risks evaluated by the original
and modified TOPAZ-TAXIR models for three
crossing distances.
Crossing
distance

500 m
1000 m
2000 m

Original
Collision Risk
(occurrence per
take-off)
1.3 10-8
1.1 10-8
8.0 10-9

Modified
Collision Risk
(occurrence per
take-off)
1.2 10-8
7.1 10-9
4.4 10-9

The collision risk value that result from the TOPAZTAXIR simulations is composed of risk contributions
from combinatorially many event sequences (Stroeve
et al., 2003). In particular, the event sequence classes
include the status of technical systems, such as
alerting systems and communication systems, aircraft
types, and human operator situation awareness. Since
the adaptations of TOPAZ-TAXIR in the integration
process with Air-MIDAS all consider assumptions
regarding the behaviour of pilots flying, it is
interesting to compare the risk decomposition for a
pilot flying in the original and modified models. In
particular, in Figure 2, collision risk results are
shown for the situations that
• the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft believes
to be on a regular taxiway, or
• The pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft
believes that runway crossing is allowed.
In the first case the pilot is lost, in the second case
the situation awareness corresponds well with the
actual position of the aircraft. It can be observed
in Figure 2 that in both the original and the
modified model, the risk contribution for the
situation that the pilot is aware to be on a regular
taxiway exceeds the risk contribution for the
situation that the pilot is aware to be on a runway
crossing. However, the difference between those
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risk contributions is smaller in the modified
model than in the original model.
On the one hand, the reduced difference in the risk
contributions between the model versions is due to an
increase in the risk contribution for the situation that
the pilot flying is aware to be on a runway crossing in
the modified model. The model modifications that
may effect this risk increase concern the braking
initiation times by the pilots flying of both aircraft,
and the duration of the visual observation tasks of the
pilots flying of both aircraft.
For a further evaluation of the effects of these
modifications a sensitivity analysis is required. As a
preliminary finding, the risk increase is especially
due to the increase in mean braking initiation times
and may be to a smaller extent due to the increase in
mean visual observation time in the opportunistic
mode.
On the other hand, the reduced difference in the risk
contributions between the model versions is due to a
decrease in the risk contribution for the situation that
the pilot flying is aware to be on a regular taxiway in
the modified model. The risk decrease in this
situation is effected by all model modifications. The
combined effect of the changes in the braking
initiation times and the visual observation times is a
risk increase. The decrease in the mean intermonitoring time of the pilot flying of the taxiing
aircraft leads to a risk decrease because it causes the
pilot to monitors for conflicting traffic more often.
The combined effect turns out to decrease risk.
Conclusions
The results showed that the Air-MIDAS based
adaptation did lead up to a factor two reduction in
assessed collision risk level. This result alone
demonstrates that it is feasible and useful to couple
Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ. More importantly this
means that we have now running two human
performance simulations for more or less the same
situation. This gave us the unique chance to make
further comparisons between the two simulation
approaches.
We examined the change in collision risk assessment
resultant from the integration of these two models. In
the scenario examined, the actions of the flight crew
and ATC are largely perceptual-motor response to
runway incursion. The impact assessment reported
reflects the change in those characteristics. More
complex decision making or coordinated action
among agents and safety augmentation technologies
would require full representation of the models of

those more complex interactions.
In order to recognize the logical pattern in these
differences, one should be aware that both are aimed
to assess quite different top-level metrics. AirMIDAS top-level metric is the behavioral pattern of
human operators; while TOPAZ top-level metric is
collision risk. The implied focal attention in TOPAZ
is on performance, error making and error
propagation among multiple agents versus memory
and task scheduling and performance in Air-MIDAS.
For error mechanisms the error recovery model of
Amalberti & Wioland (1997) has been reported for
two types of stress levels. This is reflected by the two
control modes of TOPAZ and avoids the need to
model a lot of memory and task performance
characteristics. In Air-MIDAS the adoption of the
Skill Rule Knowledge (SRK) model of Rasmussen
for task performance leads to three control modes,
and with this the need to model memory and task
scheduling and performance in detail. The
complementarity of TOPAZ and Air-MIDAS makes
it so interesting to compare simulation results
obtained by both approaches.
From a validation perspective both approaches have
much in common: they produce results on basis of
carrying
out
simulations
with
a
mathematical/computational model and by its very
nature, a mathematical/computational model differs
from
reality.
In
order
to
validate
a
mathematical/computational model in a systematic
way, the following activities should be performed:
• Identification of the differences between the
mathematical model and the reality, and
• Assessment of the effect of these differences
on the value of the output metric(s).
This validation process termed bias and uncertainty
assessment is scheduled to be undertaken for the
integrated simulations of Air-MIDAS and TOPAZTAXIR for the runway operation considered.
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AB INITIO TRAINING IN THE GLASS COCKPIT ERA:
NEW TECHNOLOGY MEETS NEW PILOLTS
A Preliminary Descriptive Analysis
Paul A. Craig, John E. Bertrand, Wayne Dornan, Steve Gossett, Kimberly K. Thorsby
Middle Tennessee State University
Murfreesboro, Tennessee
The Aerospace Department at Middle Tennessee State University and the NASA Langley Research Center
entered into a cooperative agreement in 2003. The project is named the SATS Aerospace Flight Education
Research (SAFER) and is part of NASA’s Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) initiative. The
SATS project envisions a future flight environment that employs small aircraft to transport people and
cargo from point to point using smaller, under utilized airports instead of major gridlocked airports. The
aircraft used in the SATS vision would take advantage of a range of emerging technologies including glass
cockpits, new structures, and new engines. But with the understanding that the best aircraft and the best
systems are still only as good as its operator, MTSU Aerospace set out to explore how pilot training might
be different in the SATS environment. The SAFER project therefore takes beginner pilots and completes
their initial Visual Flight (VFR) and Instrument Flight (IFR) flight training in technically advanced aircraft
to determine how best to educate the next generation of pilots in the next generation of aircraft.
Introduction
Once the use of “glass cockpit” technology was
reserved for airline and military flight crews.
Today this technology can be purchased off-theshelf from several general aviation aircraft
manufacturers. Placing a general aviation pilot
directly into such a sophisticated cockpit has
many worried. The General Aviation Technically
Advanced Aircraft (TAA)– Safety Study (2003)
has already identified several accidents attributed
to the fact that the pilots were not familiar with
the technology available to them in their aircraft.
Several studies are underway to aid pilots as they
transition from round-dial airplanes to
computerized flight displays – but that is not the
emphasis of the study at MTSU. The SAFER
project brings in potential pilots with little or no
previous experience and teaches them to fly from
the beginning with TAA.
The Students
All the students of the SAFER project are
college students majoring in Aerospace at
Middle Tennessee State University. To become
eligible for the SAFER project students had to
meet two criteria. First, they must have already
been accepted into the program’s flight
laboratory, which requires a 2.5 cumulative
college GPA, or a 2.8 high school GPA for
incoming freshman students.
Second, the
students must have had less than five flight hours
of experience with a flight instructor. Fifteen
students formed the first cohort of SAFER
students. The training began in September 2004

as the fall semester started. The second cohort
began in January 2005 as the spring semester
started.
The Training Syllabus
The features of the Garmin G-1000 system make
it possible to blend the world of visual flight and
the world of instrument flight – but that is not the
traditional way that students are taught today.
Students are taught visual flying first and pass a
series of tests to obtain the Private Pilot
Certificate. The Private Pilot then takes on
additional training and testing to become
Instrument Rated and this allows the pilot to fly
in and through the clouds. The Primary Flight
Display of the G-1000 provides a representation
of the horizon that is far advanced from basic
attitude gyro indications. The system, in effect,
turns a dark night into daylight, and clouds into
clear weather. The researchers wanted to take
advantage of this capability and sought to teach
the new students both the visual and instrument
skills all at once.
Part of the cooperative agreement with NASA
called for the SAFER project to work in
conjunction with the FAA Industry Training
Standards (FITS) initiative. The FITS group had
previously developed a generic flight training
syllabus that combined the training for both
Private Pilot and the Instrument Rating into one.
The SAFER team took the generic FITS
combination syllabus and rewrote it for specific
use at MTSU. In time, the syllabus was approved
by the FAA under Part 141 and added to

153

MTSU’s existing Air Agency Certificate. The
MTSU version of the FITS syllabus (2004)
became the first combination Private and
Instrument Course for Technically Advanced
Aircraft ever approved by the FAA.
The syllabus was unique in two other important
ways. First, the entire combination Private and
Instrument
course
is
scenario
based.
Traditionally, pilots are trained using a series of
maneuvers that the student masters with drill and
practice. The SAFER syllabus still teaches basic
skills, sometimes referred to as “stick and
rudder” skills, but instead of drill and practice,
the maneuver is incorporated into an overall
scenario lesson. The very first lesson of the
SAFER syllabus is a flight to another airport – a
mission, rather than a set of maneuvers. The
second unique feature of the SAFER syllabus is
that it has no minimum flight time requirements.
Traditionally trained students must meet several
minimum flight time requirements to move from
one step to another and to receive FAA pilot
certification. It would be possible for a pilot to
have achieved an acceptable performance level
in a particular area of training, but still be
required to take additional training just to reach
the minimum flight time number. Students in the
SAFER project are judged by performance only
not flight time. When students complete each
lesson of the SAFER syllabus they are
recommended for testing regardless of how
many or how few flight hours they have accrued.
The FAA Exemption
A major problem for the SAFER students is that
they are training in a time of transition. The
syllabus that they use and the airplane that they
use are all new, but the FAA testing is old.
Today, the Code of Federal Regulations 14, Part
61.65(a)(1) (2005) requires that an applicant for
the Instrument Rating, already be the holder of
the Private Pilot Certificate. But the SAFER
syllabus bypasses the Private Pilot test when
students would otherwise be eligible to take it.
Instead, the SAFER students remain as student
pilots until the day that they take the
combination test and become Private Pilots and
Instrument Pilots all at once. So the SAFER
syllabus, is in fact, in violation of the Federal
Aviation Regulations. To remedy this
incongruency, the SAFER researchers petitioned
the FAA for relief from 61.65(a)(1) and on
December 10, 2004, the FAA granted an
exception to this rule for the SAFER project.

FAA exemption number 8456 (2004) allows the
SAFER students to take a single practical test to
gain both Private Pilot and Instrument Pilot
privileges. The exemption came with a new
Practical Test Standard (PTS) that is to be used
by a pilot examiner when administering the
combination test. The exemption has only been
granted to MTSU and the SAFER project and
extends until December 1, 2006.
The exemption has not eliminated all “old versus
new” roadblocks to the training. The SAFER
students still are required to take two knowledge
tests that are administered via computer. The two
tests contain questions that are not applicable to
technically advanced aircraft. The new PTS that
came along with the exemption is better than two
separate tests, but still requires many drill-andpractice type maneuvers that do not match well
with the SAFER scenario based syllabus. This
forces the SAFER students to step out of the role
of the scenario and occasionally revert back to
pure maneuver practice simply to meet the
requirements of the test. Using the old form of
testing with the new form of training has become
a very real impediment to the students that
lengthens the time of training and pushes
instructors to “teach to the test” rather than
“teach for the real world” as the SAFER project
intends to do.
The Methodology
The researchers of the SAFER project are in the
preliminary stages of the data collection. The
project is on going and the final report of
findings will come at the conclusion of the
project. The researcher are gathering data to help
answer some of the basic research questions: If
you teach people to fly from the very beginning
using glass cockpits, are there any topics and/or
skills that have been taught traditionally that are
now no longer necessary? Will glass cockpits
create new challenges for beginners that have not
been contemplated previously? Can pilots learn
essential skills faster and more completely using
TAA? To help find some answers, the
researchers started a comparison between the
SAFER students and the performance of past
students that were taught in traditional ways.
The Airplanes
In 2003, the Aerospace Department was able to
purchase 25 new airplanes for their professional
pilot degree program. Of these, eleven were
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Figure 1. Private Pilot Bottleneck. Flight Hours
versus Lesson Numbers.
Figure 1 illustrates the bottlenecks faced by
traditional students during their Private Pilot
training. The Target Time or recommended
number of flight hours that should allow mastery
in the topics and maneuvers contained in the
lesson. The Target Time comes from the
Jeppesen Private Pilot syllabus. The Average
Time is the actual average hours it took for the
traditional students to achieve mastery. It is clear
that there are two predictable bottlenecks in this
curriculum: Lessons 7 - 9, and Lessons 17 – 18.
Lessons 7, 8, and 9 occur just prior to the
students first solo flight. Lessons 17 and 18
cover cross-country navigation planning.
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Using the archival data provided by the FAA
training records, the researchers examined the
process of traditional training. What was
discovered was a pattern of predictable
bottlenecks throughout the training. A
bottleneck, for this purpose, is defined as a
lesson or area of training that requires the student
to receive additional instruction, beyond that
which is prescribed in the FAA syllabus, to reach
mastery of that lesson or area. These bottlenecks
represent areas that are more difficult for
students, in that it requires more training to
achieve the completion standards. One of the
basic research questions is: Do the SAFER
students experience the same bottlenecks in their
training as traditional students do? Would
SAFER students have less problems, or different
problems than their counterparts who received
the type of training that is available nationwide
to the general public and to other college

Target Time

XC

Bottlenecks

P1

The researchers first looked backward to
evaluate traditional flight training from the first
flight until a person became an Instrument Rated
Pilot. The pilot training records of past students
served as archival data of traditional flight
training. Nineteen past student training records
were used in the study. Researchers took the
training records of students who had taken both
their Private Pilot and Instrument Pilot training
all at MTSU and all used the traditional FAA
approved syllabus. The traditional syllabus
adopted by MTSU and approved by the FAA is
the Jeppesen Private Pilot Syllabus (2002) and
the instrument portion of the Jeppesen
Instrument and Commercial Syllabus (2003).
The two publications are commercially available
and widely used as an industry standard
throughout civilian flight training. The
traditional path from first flights to Instrument
Rated pilot goes first through the Private Pilot
curriculum and testing, then through a series of
visual flights to other airports (cross country),
and finally to the specific training that leads to
testing for the Instrument Rating.
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Early Findings

students? In order to answer this question the
researchers first identified the traditional
bottlenecks in the three phases of the training:
Private Pilot, Cross Country, and Instrument.

XC

Diamond DA40s. As a part of the NASA
cooperative agreement, five of the DA40s came
to MTSU with the Garmin G-1000 glass cockpit
system installed. These five airplanes were taken
out of the traditional flight training fleet and are
used exclusively within the SAFER project.

Figure 2. Cross Country Bottlenecks. Flight
Hours versus Lesson Numbers.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the
target flight hours and the actual average time
students needed in the cross-county phase. As
Figure 2 indicates, students have few bottlenecks
in this part of the curriculum. In fact, from
Lessons 36 – 42, the students are actually flying
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less than prescribed. These lessons each require a
flight to another airport with varying distances,
but all greater than 50 nautical miles. One
possible reason for the fact that average flight
time is less than prescribed time in Lessons 39
through 42 is so students can make up for time
overruns during the Private Pilot phase of
training. If a student passes the Private Pilot tests
with above average total flight time, this could
be made up by undercutting the prescribed crosscountry flight time.
7
Target Time

6

Average Time
5
4
3
2
1
0
IFR1

IFR4

IFR7 IFR10 IFR13 IFR16 IFR19 IFR22 IFR25 IFR28

Figure 3. Instrument Rating Bottleneck. Flight
Hours versus Lesson Numbers.
Figure 3 illustrates that last portion of the path to
the Instrument Rating – the actual instrument
training. Three bottlenecks are evident in the
Jeppesen syllabus for instrument lessons: Lesson
12, Lessons 20 and 21, and Lesson 27. Lesson 12
contains the skill of VOR tracking and radial
intercepting as well as partial panel tracking.
Lessons 20 and 21 contain the ILS instrument
approach, including the partial panel ILS. Lesson
27 is an instrument cross-country review flight.

during the Private Pilot and Cross Country
phases of training past the first solo, and 45.2%
of the setbacks took place within the instrument
phase of the training. This tends to indicate that
traditional students run into difficult lessons
throughout the entire curriculum in all phases of
Private, Cross Country and Instrument – there is
never a time when it becomes “easier” for them.
First SAFER Student Data
Since the SAFER syllabus does not have
minimum flight times for the course or for each
lesson, there is no target flight time number to
compare with actual flight time averages, as was
the case with the traditional students’ data. This
makes a direct comparison between Traditional
and SAFER student performance more difficult.
Also, the Traditional students and the SAFER
students do not come across the same topics in
the same order, so a lesson-by-lesson
comparison is also not direct. However, over the
course of the SAFER syllabus, the same set of
mastery skills are required, so an evaluation of
student setbacks among the groups is possible.
The SAFER students within the first cohort
experienced a total of 97 setbacks. Again, a
setback is a repeated lesson. Lessons from both
traditional and SAFER syllabi require a mastery
of the subject matter before the student moves on
to the next lesson, so a repeated lesson indicates
that the student had difficulty with the subject
matter contained in the lesson. Of the 97
setbacks, 59 took place among the SAFER
students in the first nine, pre-solo lessons. This
represents 60.8% of the total setbacks. The
traditional students only had 17.1% of their
setbacks occur during this portion of the
curriculum.

Setbacks
Figures 1, 2, and 3 all illustrate the average
number of flight hours that was required by
students to reach mastery on that lesson. The
researchers also observed the number of
“setbacks” that a student experienced. A setback,
in this case, is the need for a student to repeat a
lesson that was previously flown. Among the
archival data retrieved from the traditional
student’s training records, 449 setbacks were
discovered. Of these, 77 setbacks took place just
prior to the first solo flight – an area identified as
a bottleneck in Figure 1. This number is 17.1%
of all the setbacks experienced by traditional
students. Setbacks continued for the traditional
students throughout the remainder of the
curriculum: 37.6% of the setbacks occurred

Traditional
Pre Solo
77 of 449 17.1%
Pvt & X-C 169 of 449 37.6%
Instrument 203 of 449 45.2%

SAFER
59 of 97 60.8%
15 of 97 15.4%
23 of 97 23.7%

Table 1. Setback Percentages
Table 1 presents the comparison of setbacks
among the two pilot groups. The traditional
students had far fewer setbacks in the early, presolo training, but their setbacks increase as they
progress through the syllabus. The SAFER
students had the greatest difficulty early on, but
their setbacks diminished as they continued
through the SAFER syllabus.
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Skills Comparison
The lessons in the traditional curriculum
produced student bottlenecks at Private Pilot
lessons 7, 8, 9, and 17, and in the Instrument
syllabus at lessons 12, 20, 21, 24, and 27. These
lessons each contain many maneuvers and
procedures embedded within each lesson, but
there is a main area of lesson emphasis in each
case. A bottleneck is an area in which students
experience difficulty, so the main area of that
lesson’s emphasis would therefore be the source
of that difficulty.
Takeoff, landing, and
emergency procedures present a significant
challenge to all beginning flight students –
especially landings. Evidence of this fact is
shown by the bottleneck present with traditional
students at lessons 7, 8, and 9, and by the
disproportionately large number of setbacks at
Lesson 9 for the SAFER students. This is the
phase of flight where Traditional students out
performed the SAFER students – see Table 1
where just prior to solo is where 60% of all
SAFER setbacks took place and where only 17%
of Traditional students setback took place.
Beyond this phase of flight training however, the
SAFER students reduced their number of
setbacks precisely in areas where Traditional
student hit bottlenecks.
On Lesson 17, Traditional students hit a
bottleneck – see Figure 1. This area of emphasis
is Cross Country Flight Planning. This lesson
requires the student to obtain and assess weather
information that is pertinent to a proposed visual
flight. The student must plan a course of flight
allowing for wind drift. The student must
calculate time, speed, and fuel consumption for
the flight and become extremely familiar with
aeronautical charts that depict the terrain features
that the flight will traverse. Many traditional
students experience a setback at this point,
requiring repeat lessons and often multiple
repeated lessons. Among the Traditional students
there was 0.75 setbacks per student on Lesson
17. In the SAFER syllabus, Lesson 11 is the first
lesson in which Cross Country Flight Planning
becomes the complete responsibility of the
student. Note that SAFER students start
conducting mission-oriented flights to other
airports from Lesson 1, so at this point they have
already been exposed to the elements of Cross
Country Planning. SAFER students experienced
very few setbacks – an average of only 0.18
setbacks per student on Lesson 11.

Holding patterns prove to be difficult for
students when learning the basics of instrument
flying. Figure 3 indicates a gap between the
target flight time and the actual flight time
required to master Holding Patterns at Lessons
14, 15, and 16. Traditional students had 1.06
setbacks per student through these lessons.
SAFER students also had difficulty with Holding
Patterns. SAFER Lessons 24 and 25 cover
Holding Patterns and students on these two
lessons had an average of 0.85 setbacks per
student.
One of the two largest bottlenecks that faced the
Traditional students in the Instrument phase of
training took place at Lesson 20 – 22. Lessons
20, 21 and 22 require the student to meet
completion standards in the skills of Instrument
Landing System (ILS) approaches and Partial
Panel Approaches. The ILS requires excellent
finesse of the airplane and Partial Panel work
requires excellent situational awareness. Eleven
percent of all Traditional student setbacks
occurred in these three lessons alone, producing
an average of 3.2 setbacks per student. At Lesson
22 of the SAFER syllabus, students have been
tracking the ILS localizer for several lessons, but
Lesson 22 is where full ILS and Partial Panel
approaches are among the completion standards.
SAFER students had no setbacks on Lesson 22.
The final test of an instrument pilot’s readiness is
IFR Flight Planning. This requires the instrument
pilot to plan and assess the weather, and the
weather minimums. The pilot must calculate
speed, time, and fuel consumption, but also plan
on a flight to an alternate airport if the weather is
unsuitable at the intended destination. The pilot
must be able to file and later receive an IFR
clearance and be able to expertly communicate
with air traffic controllers all through the flight.
Traditional students had a setback at this lesson
with an average of 1.18 setbacks per student. The
recommended amount of flight time to complete
this lesson is 2.0 flight hours. Traditional
students however took 5.8 hours, on average, to
meet the completion standards of the lesson. In
the SAFER syllabus, the IFR Flight Planning
review lesson is number 26. No SAFER students
had a setback on Lesson 26.
A comparison of average student setbacks across
the entire curriculum reveals that SAFER
students have more setbacks in the pre-solo
phase than do the Traditional students. But
Traditional students continue to have setbacks in
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rising numbers throughout, while SAFER
students have a reduction in setbacks. Figure 4
illustrates the average number of setbacks among
student for the Pre-solo lesson, the remainder of
the Private and Cross Country training, and the
Instrument Rating instruction.
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Start

SAFER
Traditional

Presolo

Pvt X-C

IFR

Figure 4. Setbacks per student. Traditional
students versus SAFER students.
Conclusions
The researchers understand that we are dealing
with small groups and that much more data must
be taken before any claims can be made. But at
this point the SAFER students have a greater
number of setbacks in the lesson just prior to the
first solo flight than do traditional students. The
flight instructors that teach in the SAFER project
say that the SAFER syllabus is very “front end
loaded.” This means that SAFER students are
being taught cross-country flight planning,
navigation, and instrument flight principles all
before the first solo. The evidence, including
Figure 4, seems to suggest that SAFER students
pay a penalty for this expanded curriculum at the
very start of the course. Traditional students are
not taught cross country planning, navigation,
and instrument principles before solo, and spend
their time practicing takeoffs and landings in
anticipation of the first solo. This focused
attention on solo among traditional students may
be why they perform with fewer setbacks in the
pre-solo phase. But it appears that the “penalty”
the SAFER students pay in the early lessons, are
repaid later in the syllabus. The SAFER students
seem to start reaping the rewards of their
expanded curriculum after the first solo as the
need for repeat lessons drops off to an average of
only 0.76 setbacks per student between solo and
the end of the SAFER stage 2 – which is
approximately the cross country stage for
Traditional student. Traditional students at this
point experience an average of 9.73 setbacks.
The evidence indicates that the largest benefit of
the SAFER project is toward the end when both

groups are preparing for the tests that cover the
Instrument Rating. In that last phase of training
the Traditional students had an average of 11.73
setbacks each, while the number of average
setbacks among SAFER students was 1.76 each.
All the data presented here should be considered
preliminary. The second SAFER cohort is
underway at the time of this writing and the
researchers will wait to see what additional data
will bring to the conclusions. It is important to
emphasize here that one of the overriding interest
of the SATS program is to see if pilots can be
trained in technically advanced aircraft that will
meet or exceed the current training standards and
to accomplish this in less time and with less
money. The early information shows that the
SAFER students who have completed the
program and passed the combination Private
Pilot and Instrument Rating test have done so
with an average of 88.66 flight hours. The
student who followed the traditional path
completed the Instrument Rating at an average of
134.3 flight hours. The difference between the
averages is approximately 45 hours. Forty-hours
of flight instruction and airplane rental could cost
the pilot approximately $6,000.
Although early in the project, the researchers are
confident that the use of “glass cockpit”
technology together with scenario training has
great promise. Data from the remainder of the
SAFER project will produce a list of “best
practices” for flight instructors to use when
teaching in TAAs. Ultimately, the project should
lead to improvements and alterations to how
pilots are to be trained in an environment of
emerging technologies.
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Cognitive complexity is a term that appears frequently in air traffic control research literature, yet there has not been
a significant distinction between different components of complexity, such as environmental, organizational, and
display complexity, all which influence cognitive complexity. It is not well understood if and how these different
sources of complexity add to controller cognitive complexity and workload. In order to address this need for
complexity decomposition and deconstruction, an experiment was conducted to explore whether or not different
components of complexity could be effectively measured and compared. The goal of the experiment was to quantify
whether or not structure in airspace sector design, in combination with changes in the external airspace environment,
added to or mitigated perceived complexity measured through performance. The results demonstrate that for a
representative ATC task, the dynamic environment complexity source was a significant contributor to performance,
causing lower performance scores. There was no apparent effect, either positive or negative, from increasing
airspace structure represented through a display.
Introduction
Addressing the difference between environmental
and innate human complexity (often referred to as
cognitive complexity), Herb Simon describes an ant’s
path as it navigates across a beach. The ant
eventually reaches its destination, but because the ant
must constantly adapt its course as a result of
obstacles, the path seems irregular, laborious, and
inefficient. Simon points out that while the ant’s path
seems complex, the ant’s behavior is relatively
simple as compared to the complexity of the
environment. Simon proposes the following
hypothesis as a result, “Human beings, viewed as
behaving systems, are quite simple. The apparent
complexity of our behavior over time is largely a
reflection of the complexity of the environment in
which we find ourselves (Simon, 1981, p. 53).”
This distinction between innate or cognitive
complexity and environmental complexity is
especially relevant considering the considerable
research conducted in air traffic controller cognitive
complexity. Several studies have investigated air
traffic control (ATC) information complexity issues
(see Hilburn, 2004; Majumdar & Ochieng, 2002) for
a review). In this literature, several common
complexity factors have emerged to include traffic
density, traffic mix, aircraft speeds, sector size, and
transitioning aircraft. These factors are asserted to
affect cognitive complexity. However, in light of
Simon’s ant parable, these factors really represent
environmental complexity factors that influence
cognitive complexity. This is an important distinction

because as can be seen in Figure 1, there are several
levels of complexity that can affect an individual’s
cognitive complexity level.
Figure 1 illustrates the decomposition of
“complexity” as it applies to human supervisory
control systems. Human supervisory control (HSC)
occurs when a human operator intermittently
interacts with an automated system, receiving
feedback from and providing commands to a
controlled process or task environment (Sheridan,
1992). In complex HSC systems, in general two
layers of interventions, organizational and display
design can exist to mitigate environmental
complexity, and thus reduce cognitive complexity.
Organizational interventions include goals, policies,
and procedures such as separation standards,
checklists, airspace structure, etc. For example, many
airspace sectors are designed to promote predominant

Figure 1: Human Supervisory Control Complexity Chain
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traffic flows. Thus the design and the associated rules
and procedures for control mitigate environmental
complexity caused by increasing numbers of planes.
However, when airspace becomes obstructed and
saturated due to weather, congestion, etc., the need to
follow procedures and sector limitations can overconstrain a problem, thus increasing the perceived
complexity by the controller.
Displays are another example of intended
complexity mitigation which could inadvertently
add to complexity instead of reducing it. For air
traffic controllers and in general all HSC operators,
displays are critical in representing the environment
so that a correct mental model can be formed and
correct interactions can take place (Woods, 1991).
In effect, to mitigate complexity, displays should
reduce workload through transforming highworkload cognitive tasks such as mental
computations into lower workload tasks through
direct perception, i.e. visually (Miller, 2000).
However, in complex and dynamic HSC domains
such as ATC, it is not always clear whether a
decision support interface actually alleviates or
contributes to the problem of complexity.
Complexity and Structure
In addition to traffic density and related factors, it has
also been hypothesized that the underlying airspace
structure is a critical complexity factor (Histon et al.,
2002). In theory, airspace structure provides the
basis for mental abstractions which allows controllers
to reduce complexity and maintain situation
awareness. Histon et. al., (2002) propose that these
mental abstractions, known as structured-based
abstractions, can be generalized to standard flows
(reminiscent of Pawlak’s (1996) “streams”),
groupings, and critical points. Providing air traffic
controllers with these interventions, either explicitly
through design or implicitly through policy, should
help controllers improve through mental models,
reduce overall complexity, as well as reduce
perceived workload.
In a study investigating judgment and complexity,
Kirwan et al., (2001) determined that airspace sector
design was only second to traffic volume, in terms of
contributing to cognitive complexity. In terms of the
model in Figure 1, airspace sector design straddles
both the organizational and display complexity
categories. Designed by humans to mitigate
environmental complexity, airspace structure is an
organizational policy. However, airspace structure
contains significant visual components represented in
displays, thus it is an environmental complexity

intervention both from an organizational and
display perspective.
Including interventions in airspace sector design such
as critical points (points through which aircraft must
pass) and designated standard flows (such as jet
ways) can increase order and improve predictability,
and thus lower cognitive complexity. However, it is
also possible that when uncertainty levels increase,
usually as a function of dynamic environmental
factors such as changes in weather and available
airspace, these same airspace structures could
actually add to complexity since a controller’s mental
model of the airspace design must be adapted to the
new conditions. Airspace structure and procedures
mitigate complexity in what are termed “nominal”
situations, but when an “off-nominal” condition
occurs, such as an emergency or unexpected weather
phenomena, the resultant increasing uncertainty
causes complexity to grow (Athenes, Averty,
Puechmorel, Delahaye, & Collet, 2002).
While other research has attempted to quantify the
individual elements of complexity as a function of
traffic flow (Masalonis, Callaham, & Wanke, 2003),
little attention has been directed towards
understanding the different sources of complexity
such as depicted in Figure 1. In addition it is not clear
if and how these different sources of complexity add
to controller cognitive complexity. In order to
address this need for complexity decomposition and
deconstruction, an experiment was conducted to
explore whether or not elements of complexity as
depicted in Figure 1 could be effectively measured
and compared.
Method
Apparatus, Participants, and Procedure
To objectively investigate the impact of
environmental and structural complexity factors on
controller performance, a human-in-the-loop
simulation test bed was programmed in MATLAB®
(Figures 2 & 3). Since the subject pool consisted
primarily of college students, it was necessary to
devise a simplified and abstract task that addressed
the aforementioned complexity concerns, but still
represented fundamental elements of ATC. In a
simplified en route task, subject controllers were
assigned a single sector, and were only required to
provide heading commands to aircraft, while
velocities and altitudes were held constant.
Twenty egress areas were located in the periphery of
the sector, and each incoming aircraft was assigned a
specific egress point. The primary goal was to direct
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the aircraft (a/c) to the assigned egress, and when an
aircraft exited correctly, a score was generated. To
provide an incentive for flying through a predetermined sequence of waypoints (representative of
a flight plan), subjects could collect additional points
by directing their a/c through these waypoints. The
number of points that could be won at every
waypoint was displayed. To discourage controllers
from directing aircraft through unnecessary
waypoints just to gain points, scores were penalized
based on an aircraft’s total time of presence in the
airspace sector beyond that expected for the optimal
pre-determined path. A final component of the
overall score was the penalty for flying through a nofly-zone. No-fly zones represented constrained ATC
airspace such as thunderstorms, military operating
areas, and prohibited areas. Example waypoints,
optimal paths for particular ingress and egress points,
and no-fly zones are represented in Figure 2.
Maximization of total score was the subjects’ goal,
and their total score was displayed in real-time.

to every combination of independent variables. They
then began the randomly ordered four test sessions,
which also lasted until all aircraft had exited the
airspace (approximately 6-7 minutes).
Experimental Design
Two independent variables were investigated. The
first independent variable was the presence of
structure, as displayed through the lines of maximum
score (named “displayed structure”). As can be seen
in Figure 2, in certain scenarios subjects were given
structure through the display of the optimum paths
(those that maximized the score as a function of
waypoints and time). In the counter condition,
subjects were given the waypoints (along with the
number of available points), but were not shown the
optimal path (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Interface with dynamic no-fly-zones
Figure 2: Interface with optimal paths shown
Training and testing were conducted using a Dell
personal computer with a 21-inch color monitor, 16bit high color resolution, and a 3.0GHz Pentium 4
processor. During testing, all user responses were
recorded in separate files specific to each subject and
scenario. A Visual Basic script was then written that
scored and compiled the data into a single
spreadsheet file for the subsequent statistical analysis.
After signing required consent forms, subjects
completed a tutorial that discussed the nature of the
experiment, explained the context and use of the
interface, and gave them the opportunity to
understand the scoring mechanism. Subjects
completed four practice scenarios that exposed them

The second independent variable was the condition of
the environment in terms of either static or dynamic
no-fly-zones. In the dynamic condition, the no-flyzones moved at rates of about two-fifths the aircraft
velocity (figure 3), and representing changes in
constrained airspace that often occur such as weather
fronts and special-use airspace. It is important to note
that the displayed lines were the optimum, but only in
cases where they were not obstructed. In the dynamic
condition, the dynamic no-fly zones cases would
sometimes cover the paths, and thus the controller
had to mentally regenerate new optimal paths. The
motivation was to investigate whether or not such
visual structure in an airspace sector, in combination
with changes in the external airspace environment,
added to or mitigated perceived complexity measured
through performance.
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A single dependent variable of total performance
score was used. As described previously, the score
was a linear and weighted function of aircraft egress
correctness, bonus waypoints with penalties for nofly-zone violations, and total time transitioning in
sector. In the case of egress score, subjects received
maximum points by directing their a/c to exit near the
center of the egress, but did not receive points for
exiting through the wrong egress. The egress scores
decreased linearly from the center to the marked
edges of the egress blocks. To maintain consistent
scenario level of difficulty in order to minimize any
learning effect, the four experimental scenarios were
ninety degree rotations of each other. The statistical
model used was a 2x2 fully crossed ANOVA and the
four scenarios were randomly presented to a total of
20 subjects.
Results and Discussion
The 2x2 ANOVA linear model (with and without
displayed structure and dynamic vs. static environment)
revealed that for the performance dependent variable,
the environment factor was significant (F(1,74) =
54.55), p < .001, all < .05). The displayed structure
factor and the environment*displayed structure
interaction were not significant. Figure 4 depicts the
average performance scores across all four conditions. It
can be seen on inspection that the performance scores
were clearly higher in the static environment scenario as
opposed to the dynamic environment phase. Whether
subjects had less or more displayed airspace structure
did not significantly affect their scores. These results
demonstrate that for this representative ATC task, the
environmental complexity factor was a significant
contributor to performance, causing lower performance
scores. There was no apparent effect, either positive or
negative, from increasing airspace structure.
In terms of the model in Figure 1, this experiment
demonstrated for this representative ATC task, the
main component of complexity associated with
controller workload was environment, and not
organizational or display-related. Dynamically
changing airspace structure was far more influential
than the design of the airspace itself. Thus while
sector design may be a contributing factor to air
traffic controller performance, environmental
complexity factors such as thunderstorms and special
use airspace that intermittently becomes available,
are significantly larger contributors to individual
cognitive complexity.
These results provide quantitative support for
previous subjective assessments of controllers that
active special use airspace increases complexity and
would benefit from some display intervention

(Ahlstrom, Rubinstein, Siegel, Mogford, & Manning,
2001). In light of the results reported here, it is likely
that special use airspace (SUA), an organizational
constraint, can increase complexity for controllers not
because of the actual structure of the airspace,
because the status can change. When SUAs cycle
between active and inactive, especially relatively
rapidly, environmental complexity increases, and
could negatively affect controller performance. Thus
a by-product of an organizational policy could be
increased complexity on the part of controllers.
These results indicate that the development of
decision support tools to aid controllers in SUA
management is an area of research that deserves more
attention Because of the temporal and cyclic nature
of SUA, possible design interventions could include
some kind of timeline display for SUA scheduling as
well as intelligent decision support agents that can
predict in advance when airspace could become
available or deactivated.
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Figure 4: Condition Mean Performance Times
Conclusion
Complexity as it applies to the air traffic control
environment cannot be simply categorized as
“cognitive complexity,” as there are different
components of complexity, which are demonstrated
in Figure 1. These components of environmental,
organizational, and display complexity may not
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contribute in a linear and consistent manner to either
cognitive complexity or performance. This study
attempted to decompose two sources of complexity,
an environmental factor caused by changing airspace,
and an organizational/display factor caused by
airspace design. Results show that the environmental
complexity source of changing airspace was far more
significant in influencing overall controller
performance. These results support air traffic
controllers’ subjective opinions that special use
airspace is a source of complexity (Ahlstrom et al.,
2001), and that more work is needed for better
display representation.
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